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At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy is the little man,
walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on
a little bit of paper-no amount of rhetoric or voluminous discussion
can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of the point.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Decennial Imbroglio
VERY ten years the Texas Legislature faces the task of redistricting
boundaries for the state's congressional and legislative districts. 2
Four sections of the Texas Constitution set forth the requirements
for legislative redistricting. 3 Many shortcomings exist in these provisions,
and they provide an inadequate guide for the legislature during the redis-
tricting process: The Texas Constitution does not mention congressional re-
districting, and it fails to designate a chairman or describe the mechanics of
the Legislative Redistricting Board (LRB).4 The constitutional sections are
anachronistic in that they do not reflect the growth in United States consti-
tutional and statutory law on redistricting. The Texas constitutional provi-
sion that no single county shall be entitled to more than one senator 5 violates
the United States Constitution's version of the one person, one vote princi-
ple.6 Finally, neither the Texas Constitution nor state statutory law provides
* B.A. with Honors, Austin College; M.P.A., LBJ School of Public Affairs; Recipient,
Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation Award for Academic Excellence; J.D. with Honors, Uni-
versity of Texas; Fellow, Texas Bar Foundation. Legislative Aide to State Senator Ray
Farabee (1983); Attorney, Akin, Gamp, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Dallas, Texas.
1. Speech by Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, House of Commons
(Oct. 31, 1944).
2. See TEX. CONST. art. II1, §§ 25-26a, 28.
3. Id. §§ 25-28.
4. The LRB, established by the Texas Constitution, consists of five officials elected state-
wide. In 1981 all LRB members were Democrats. TEX. CONST. art. Ill, § 28 requires only
that the LRB meet within 90 days after adjournment of the regular session of the Texas Legis-
lature and complete the reapportionment process within 60 days of assembly.
5. See id. art. III, § 25.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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for a procedure to comply with the preclearance requirements of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. 7
The torturous paths taken by the redistricting plans for the U.S. House of
Representatives, Texas House of Representatives, and Texas Senate follow-
ing the 1980 census illustrate a need for change in the present apportionment
process from that described in the Texas Constitution.8 During the special
session of the summer of 1981, both houses of the Sixty-seventh Texas Legis-
lature passed a bill redistricting Texas's congressional seats. 9 After the Gov-
ernor signed the redistricting bill, minority groups claimed that the new law
discriminated against minorities, and they filed suit in the federal district
court for the Eastern District of Texas challenging the statute.' 0 While the
suit was pending, the United States Department of Justice I1 rejected the leg-
islative plan and ruled that the Texas Legislature had failed to increase the
Mexican-American voting strength in South Texas. 12 The Justice Depart-
ment's ruling delayed candidate filing deadlines for sixteen of Texas's
twenty-seven United States congressional districts, and a panel of three
United States district judges redrew the plans, altering districts for South
Texas and Dallas County.13
Upon review of the case 14 the United States Supreme Court held that the
lower federal court had erroneously established congressional districts for
Dallas County because of a retrogressive effect on minority groups. 15 The
Court, however, left to the panel the decision of whether to implement the
erroneous court-ordered plan. 16 The three-judge panel implemented the
plan, and the Supreme Court affirmed the implementation.' 7
The Sixty-seventh Texas Legislature also redrew the Texas House and
Senate district boundaries.' 8 Several members of the legislature brought a
class action suit to strike down the redistricting bill. The Texas Supreme
Court, in Clements v. Valles,' 9 struck down the house plan, holding that the
7. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
8. See TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 25-26a, 28.
9. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 197f (Vernon Supp. 1981) (repealed 1983). The
senate consists of 31 members representing identified districts of the state, while the house of
representatives consists of 150 members who also represent identified districts in the state. See
TEX. CONST. art. 111, § 2. The state legislature meets in regular session for 120 days in odd-
numbered years. See id. § 5; TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 301.001 (Vernon 1988). Each regular
legislative session starts on the second Tuesday in January. See id. In addition to regular
sessions, the Governor is empowered to call the legislature into one or more special sessions,
not to exceed a period of 30 days each session. See TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 5, 40.
10. Seamon v. Upham, 536 F. Supp. 931, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
11. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandates that the Justice Department of the United
States screen redistricting plans to prevent discrimination against racial or ethnic minorities.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
12. Seamon, 536 F. Supp. at 937, 961-62.
13. Id. at 937, 955-60.
14. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982).
15. Id. at 43.
16. Id. at 44.
17. Strake v. Seamon, 469 U.S. 801 (1984).
18. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 19 5 a- 7 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
19. 620 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1981).
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plan violated the Texas constitutional prohibition against excessive cutting
across county lines.20 After the Valles decision and Governor Clements's
veto of the senate redistricting plan, the LRB redrew the house and senate
boundaries. 2 1 After the LRB redistricted both houses of the Texas Legisla-
ture, opponents quickly challenged the plans in federal court.22 The federal
suits charged the senate plan with diluting minority and Republican party
voting strength and challenged the house plan with diluting minority voting
strength.2 3 While these suits were pending, however, the Justice Depart-
ment rejected the plans because the LRB senate plan for Harris County and
Bexar County and the LRB house plan for Dallas, Bexar, and El Paso Coun-
ties failed to satisfy Voting Rights Act requirements. 24 A panel consisting of
three district judges drew interim plans for the house and senate, leaving the
final boundary determination to the Sixty-eighth Texas Legislature. 25 The
interim plans differed only slightly from those proposed by the LRB.26 The
United States Supreme Court denied an appeal without comment. 27 In 1983
the Sixty-eighth Texas Legislature approved revised plans that the three-
judge panel later upheld. 28
These legal and administrative challenges to redistricting plans cause un-
certainty for candidates and voters. Texas's experience with redistricting in
the last twenty years has included prolonged litigation, resulting in consider-
able cost and voter confusion. 29 Past experience indicates a need for the
Texas Legislature to reexamine the Texas constitutional and statutory provi-
sions affecting redistricting in order to determine if improvements can be
made to the current system.30
20. Id. at 114-15.
21. Governor Clements vetoed the senate redistricting bill on June 18, 1981. The LRB
waited until August 30, 1981, the 90th day following adjournment, to convene. Because the
supreme court's decision in Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1981), was handed down
on August 31, 1981, the LRB had sufficient time to redistrict both houses of the legislature.
22. The senate plan was challenged in CA 3-81-1946-R (W.D. Tex. 1981); the house plan
was challenged in CA 3-81-2205-R (W.D. Tex. 1981) and CA 3-81-2263-R (W.D. Tex. 1981).
All of these cases were then consolidated into a federal district court case. See Terrazas v.
Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
23. 537 F. Supp. at 519-20.
24. Id. at 520.
25. Id. at 517, 521.
26. Id. at 540-47.
27. 456 U.S. 902 (1982).
28. Terrazas v. Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
29. See Bickerstaff, Reapportionment by State Legislatures. A Guide for the 1980s, 34 Sw.
L.J. 607, 635 (1980).
30. This Article focuses on legislative redistricting. The pending federal court cases chal-
lenging the state's at-large procedure for electing judges will not be discussed in detail. See
Rangel v. Mattox, No. B-88-053; LULAC v. Clements, No. Mo-88-CA-154. Rangel challenges
the system of electing justices of the 13th Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi. L ULAC seeks
to change the at-large system of electing the district judges in 43 counties. The federal courts
may determine that the current method is unconstitutional, and they could either impose an
alternative to the at-large procedure of electing state judges or allow the Texas Legislature to
decide on an alternative.
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B. Examining the Process
This Article suggests changes to the Texas Constitution that are: (1) con-
sistent with federal constitutional, statutory, and administrative require-
ments; (2) comprehensive enough to cover the entire redistricting process;
(3) clear in terms of the criteria that should be satisfied in the process; and
(4) easy to read and comprehend. The first step involves examining the
Texas redistricting process and determining if it should be altered. The
Texas Constitution currently requires the legislature to redraw its own dis-
trict lines after the release of the decennial census figures. 3 1 Some groups,
such as Common Cause, claim that the ability of state legislators to deter-
mine their own political fates represents poor public policy. 32
In some states, all or part of the redistricting task is assigned to appointed
reapportionment committees. 33 Under current Texas law, the LRB is re-
sponsible for apportionment if the legislature fails to pass a plan during the
first regular session following the publication of the census. 34 The constitu-
tion provides for no contingency plan in the event that the LRB fails to draft
a plan, or if the courts invalidate the LRB's plan. As pointed out by the
court in Terrazas v. Clements, 35 the timing of the LRB's deliberation of the
1980 house and senate plans was fortuitous in light of the Governor's veto of
the senate plan and the Texas Supreme Court's rejection of the house plan
shortly after adjournment of the regular session. 36
The United States Constitution vests state legislatures with the authority
to redistrict congressional and state legislative boundaries. 37 As experience
in other states has shown, the possibility remains for the state legislature to
delegate redistricting authority to a nonpartisan commission, secretary of
state, state court, or other entity. 38 Careful examination of alternatives to
the present system will help determine whether other governmental bodies
should replace the Texas Legislature and LRB.
31. See TEX. CONsT. art. III, § 28.
32. For example, in 1971 a group of renegade legislators known as the "Dirty Thirty"
threatened Speaker of the House Gus Mutscher's absolute control over the Texas House. Mut-
scher used redistricting in order to pair off some of his opponents and put others in hostile
districts. See Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process.- The Continuing Quest for "Fair
and Effective Representation," 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 825, 841 (1977).
33. See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. VI, § 10; ARK. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; COLO. CONST. art.
V, § 48; CONN. CONsT. art. Ill, § 6 (assignment to committee if legislature fails to act); ILL.
CONsT. art IV, § 2 (assignment to committee if legislature fails to act); IOWA CONST. art. 1II,
§§ 34-36 (advisory only); ME. CONsT. art IV, pt. 3, § 1-A (advisory only); MICH. CONST. art.
IV, § 2; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2-9 (state and congressional plans); MONT. CONST. art. V,
§ 14; N.J. CONsT. art. IV, § 3: OHIO CONs-T. art. XI, § I; OKILA. CONsT. art. V, § I IA (assign-
ment to committee if legislature fails to act); PA. CONST. art. II, § 17; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5
(assignment to committee if legislature fails to act); VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 73 (advisory only).
34. TEX. CONsT. art. 1II, § 28.
35. 537 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
36. Id. at 537.
37. U.S. CONsr. art. I, §§ 2, 4.
38. See HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MONT. CONsT. art. V, § 14.
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C. The Need for Criteria
Although the Texas Constitution establishes the governmental bodies re-
sponsible for redistricting, neither the constitution nor statutory law focuses
in detail on any useful criteria for the formulation of the redistricting plan.
Redistricting is not accomplished in a political or sociological vacuum, and
different individuals and groups usually seek to accomplish different ends in
this process. 39 As the number of criteria increases, the number of redistrict-
ing options decreases. Suppose, for example, that the only criterion in the
redistricting process is that each congressional district be equal in popula-
tion. The redistricting body could easily transfer census data into a com-
puter and draw district lines in a matter of seconds. Over the years,
however, many other criteria have been created and justified in order to
guide the redistricting process. Because increasing the number of con-
straints in the redistricting equation necessarily means that a fewer number
of eligible plans are available, the redistricting body should exclude from
consideration those criteria of marginal importance. For purposes of this
Article, redistricting criteria will be divided into quantitative and qualitative
elements.
1. Quantitative Criteria
According to the United States Supreme Court, population equality repre-
sents the most important criterion in the redistricting process. 40 Since 1964
the Court has required very strict population standards for congressional
districts. In Wesberry v. Sanders4 for example, the Court determined that
one vote in an election is as valuable as the next.42 Because the equal protec-
tion clause embodies the standard for legislative plans, and because states
have other interests to consider in state legislative redistricting, the popula-
tion requirement for state districts is less strict.43 If equally populated dis-
tricts rank as the highest criterion in the process, however, state statutory
language revisions may allow for more restrictive quantitative criteria than
federal courts have mandated. This Article examines the legal, philosophi-
cal, and political reasons for and against such a population-restricted
proposal. 44
39. This Article refers to the "means" used toward these "ends" as the criteria or stan-
dards used by the redistricting body.
40. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
41. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
42. The stated standard by the Court was "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." Id. at 7-8.
43. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973).
44. Several logistical problems concerning the quantitative criteria exist under Texas law.
For example, the Texas Constitution expressly provides that senatorial districts are to contain
equal numbers of "qualified electors," see TEX. CONST. art. I11, § 25, rather than equal num-
bers of total population. Section 25 of the Texas Constitution served as the focus of some
controversy during and after the Sixty-seventh Legislature when Attorney General Mark
White issued an opinion stating that dividing the state into districts on the basis of qualified
electors was unconstitutional on its face. See Op. Atty. Gen. No. MW-350 (1981). In Upham
v. White, No. C-1068 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Texas, Jan. 27, 1982),




Although strict population equality serves as the foundation of the redis-
tricting process, legislators may consider other criteria. Specifically, the
nondilution of racial or ethnic minority voting rights represents the control-
ling qualitative criterion. 45 The fifteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution states that no state may abridge the right to vote on account of
race or color.46 A redistricting plan purposefully drawn to minimize the
voting strength of racial groups violates the fifteenth amendment. 47 On the
other hand, a state is not required to maximize minority voting strength. 48
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its subsequent amendments also influ-
ence nondilution criteria. Under section 5 of the Act a state is prohibited
from making any change in a voting procedure unless the state assures the
Justice Department that the change does not interfere with a person's right
to vote based on race or color.49
A second qualitative criterion, geographical integrity, also influences the
redistricting process. Under present Texas law, the legislature is required to
avoid cutting across county lines as much as possible in forming districts for
the Texas House of Representatives. 50 Senatorial districts, however, are not
subject to the same restriction. 51 The criterion of maintaining the integrity
of political subdivisions is the only state interest that the United States
Supreme Court has found sufficient to justify a 10% deviation in district
population. 52  The redistricting process often includes references to geo-
graphical criteria. For example, the Texas Constitution requires contiguity
of legislative districts. 5 3 In addition, courts have viewed compactness as a
desirable goal. 54
The Texas Constitution makes no mention of the preservation of either
violated the "qualified electors" requirement. See id. Travis County District Judge Herman
Jones denied the request for a permanent injunction, ruling that the LRB should not have to
speculate as to the appropriate source of population data. See id. The Texas Supreme Court
upheld the LRB plan, which was used in the 1982 state senatorial elections. See Upham v.
White, 639 S.W.2d 301, 301 (Tex. 1982). In addition to the "qualified electors" issue, this
Article also addresses issues such as the appropriate population base, census data, and intra-
state population shifts to determine how each should fit into the proposed redistricting process.
45. Although federal case law mandates in large part the extent of the nondilution crite-
ria, other qualitative criteria include interests such as maintaining the integrity of political
subdivisions, preservation of incumbents, and preservation of majority party voting strength.
46. U.S. CONsTr. amend. XV, § 1.
47. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980).
48. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130(1976); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). If the factors that the Civil Rights Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice uses to evaluate districting plans are clearly stated, then a change in Texas law
to reflect these same factors should be considered.
50. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26.
51. See id. § 25.
52. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324 (1973).
53. See TEX. CONST. art. 111, §§ 25, 26.
54. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425-26 (1977); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327
(S.D. Miss. 1988). But see Kirkpatrick v. Preislar, 394 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1969) (dismissing the
compactness argument). In light of these rulings, a new statutory or constitutional redistrict-
ing framework could include mathemathical tests for compactness.
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incumbent office-holders or majority party voting strength, two of the most
politically controversial criteria. Although consciously minimized in legisla-
tive debate, these two goals are of fundamental concern to Texas legislators.
The United States Supreme Court has held that districts drawn to accommo-
date incumbents are not invidiously discriminatory and, in fact, may have
certain positive features. 55
A final qualitative criterion is partisan politics and its influence on redis-
tricting. The LRB is presently composed of five Democrats. 56 The last LRB
senatorial plan was challenged by Republican Party members who feared the
plan would decrease their party's representation in the Texas Senate. 57 The
courts have generally tended to shy away from controversies involving polit-
ical parties and the election process.58 In Davis v. Bandemer,59 however, the
United States Supreme Court considered the effect on Indiana's democratic
party candidates of the 1981 legislative redistricting by the majority Republi-
can Party. The district court used statistical figures and testimony indicat-
ing partisan intent to hold that the plan discriminated against Democrats. 60
The district court further enjoined the state from holding elections pursuant
to the plan and ordered the legislature to prepare a new plan.6 1 While the
Supreme Court agreed with the district court that political gerrymandering
is properly justiciable under the equal protection clause, the Court reversed
the district court's holding because it was based on too low a threshold
test. 62
D. Other Issues
Another consideration involves the types of improvements that can be
made to the redistricting system in addition to the designation of a redistrict-
ing body and the criteria it should use. The Texas Legislature cannot deter-
mine the number of congressional seats Texas will gain or lose every ten
years, but a Texas constitutional amendment can change the number of state
senators and representatives. With the large population increases Texas has
experienced in recent years, an increase in the number of state senators and
representatives will perhaps encourage better representation and help ease
the pain of redistricting in future years. At least one federal judge has noted
that redistricting should be accomplished by the Texas Legislature, and he
hopes that the legislature will consider revisions to the redistricting process
in order to avoid the 1980 type of litigation in the future. 63
55. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89
n.16 (1966).
56. Lieutenant Governor William Hobby, Comptroller Bob Bullock, Land Commissioner
Gary Mauro, Attorney General Jim Mattox, and Speaker of the House Gib Lewis.
57. See Upham v. White, 639 S.W.2d 301, 301 (Tex. 1982).
58. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749-51 (1973).
59. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 143.
63. Judge Jerry Buchmeyer, Daily Texan, Jan. 29, 1982, at A-I.
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II. ALTERNATIVE REDISTRICTING BODIES
The United States Constitution obligates the state legislatures to reappor-
tion congressional districts. 64 These legislative bodies, however, can dele-
gate this authority. 65 In all states except Hawaii and Montana, which vest
final approval in appointed reapportionment commissions, 66 state legisla-
tures are required to vote in enacting a congressional redistricting plan.
67
Although the Texas Constitution does not discuss congressional redistrict-
ing, the Texas Legislature has assumed sole responsibility for initially draw-
ing congressional plans. 68
Texas has been innovative in redistricting house and senate seats. As
mentioned, the legislature has the first opportunity to reapportion the state
legislative districts. 69 According to the Texas Constitution, if the legislature
fails to pass a redistricting bill, then the LRB must act. 70 The Texas
Supreme Court has interpreted the appropriate constitutional provisions to
encompass not only the situations where the legislature fails to act, but also
where a plan is invalidated.7 1 Upon the occurrence of one or more of these
contingencies, the LRB must assemble within ninety days after the adjourn-
ment of the regular session. 72 The LRB then has sixty days to redistrict the
Texas House and Senate. 73 The Texas Constitution has no provision to turn
to should an adverse court or the Justice Department strike down a plan
after that period. 74
Due to the past problems with Texas legislative redistricting, alternatives
to the present practice demand attention. Five requirements are addressed
in analyzing solutions to the redistricting process. First, the process must
produce a plan that will pass review by the Justice Department as well as the
federal and state courts. Second, the process should meet the Voting Rights
Act preclearance and court challenge time constraints. Third, the process
should be inexpensive and economical. Fourth, the process must promote
fairness and equity. Finally, the process should produce a realistic political
alternative in the eyes of the public. In addressing these requirements, this
Article develops a three-pronged procedure that uses the Texas Legislature,
an appointed apportionment commission, and the courts.
64. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
65. See generally Rudolph & Rudolph, Free Government and the Doctrine of Non-Delega-
tion of Legislative Powers, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 551, 551-73 (1987) (traces functions of gov-
ernment, theory of delegation, and arguments for nondelegation).
66. See HAW. CONsT. art. IV, § 3; MONT. CONsT. art. V, § 14.
67. See supra note 33.
68. See G. BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TI]XAS: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 147-54 (1977).
69. TEX. CONsr. art. III, §§ 25, 26.
70. Id. § 28.
71. See Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. 1971).
72. See TEX. CONsT. art. I1, § 28.
73. Id.
74. The potential problems with these time constraints are discussed in Terrazas v. Cle-
ments, 537 F. Supp. 514, 534 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
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A. The Computer Alternative
Because computer use is cost-effective and impartial, computer experts,
armed with population figures and Texas guidelines, could replace the tradi-
tional human element. The machine could draw new district lines using
only the stated criteria and ignoring all other considerations. This apolitical
approach, which would appear to be an acceptable option, is, however, sub-
ject to three potential hazards. First, any criteria established by the legisla-
ture and included in computer software programs will surely fall prey to
political motivation. Second, the computer's plan would ultimately require
approval by the legislature or another body. Finally, the result of a com-
puter's analysis would naturally involve political ramifications because redis-
tricting is inherently political, whether it is carried out with a pencil and a
map or with the aid of a computer.
A good example of the fallacy of relying too heavily on computers and
similar aids is the 1980 experience in Iowa where the state required that a
nonpartisan research bureau prepare an advisory plan for the legislature's
approval. 75 In 1981, population figures and certain redistricting criteria re-
quired by Iowa law were programmed into a rented computer. One criterion
prohibited taking into account voter political affiliation or the addresses of
incumbent legislators. 76 At the time, Iowa had three Republicans and three
Democrats in the United States Congress. The Iowa Legislature rejected the
research bureau's plan because it placed two of the three Republicans in the
same district. 77 Because political considerations will continue to play an im-
portant part in any redistricting process, computers should maintain their
role only as a tool to be used by the appropriate redistricting body.
B. The Courts
The recent history of Texas redistricting is filled with litigation. At least
one Texas daily newspaper has supported putting the federal courts in
charge of the entire redistricting process. 78 If the courts are eventually going
to alter the district boundaries in any event, the argument posits, then the
Texas Constitution should assign the task to the courts initially. 79
Two good reasons, however, militate against assigning total redistricting
responsibility to the courts. First, the district lines that are subject to a court
challenge can usually be altered without making a wholesale change to the
maps. 80 Second, judges usually do not want to take on the political responsi-
75. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.2 (West Supp. 1989).
76. Id. § 42.4.
77. See Common Cause, Report on Congressional and State Redistricting-Number Two
15 (mimeographed, Washington D.C., June 1982).
78. See Austin American-Statesman, Jan. 30, 1982, at A-9.
79. If there is no way to get the chore out of the hands of the legislators, they
might as well use the same old maps every time and mail them to the nearest
federal court. Those courts don't exactly have a lot of idle time on their hands,
but it might not be a bad idea to turn them into a redistricting panel every 10
years long enough to set the district lines ....
Id.
80. For example, the redistricting maps drawn by the three-judge panels following the
1989]
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bility of redistricting seats in Congress and in state legislatures. 81 As a re-
suit, neither the courts nor the legislatures appear anxious to grant full map-
drawing authority to the judicial branch.
C. Impartial Boards or Commissions
Many "good government" groups such as Common Cause have proposed
delegating redistricting authority to impartial boards or commissions that
would consist of nonelected, nonparty officials. 82 Proponents of this ap-
proach base their proposal on two primary points. First, the commissioners
presumably would not have the same inherent conflict of interest that state
legislators possess. 83 When legislators are preoccupied with protecting their
political fates as well as that of their colleagues, public trust in the legislative
process erodes. Second, the commission method would eliminate the need
for the legislature to wrestle with a time-consuming and expensive
problem. 4
A commission-type redistricting body would not resemble the Texas LRB.
Each member of the LRB is an elected official and, at the present time, a
member of the Democratic Party.8 5 A prohibition on elected officials as
members of an independent redistricting board promotes a less partisan
board. The LRB, on the other hand, consists of the lieutenant governor, the
speaker of the house of representatives, the attorney general, the comptroller
of public accounts, and the commissioner of the General Land Office.86 The
LRB acts when a state house or senate plan fails to pass the legislature, is
vetoed by the Governor, or is struck down by the courts. 87 Common
Cause's model constitutional amendment would give the independent com-
mission initial authority to redraw the congressional and state districts. 88
The nonpartisan commission model has several variations. Common
Cause proposes that a separate five-member commission be appointed every
ten years.89 The majority and minority leaders of the state house and senate
would each appoint one member of the commission. 90 These four members
1981 lawsuit challenges were based in large part on the challenged plans and contained only
minor modifications to these plans. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982); Terrazas v.
Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
81. The United States Supreme Court stated in 1973 that it "repeatedly recognized that
state reapportionment is the task of local legislatures or of those organs of state government
selected to perform it." See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973). Furthermore,
the Court has warned that "[liegislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to
the federal courts ...... Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1977). See Gaffney v. Cum-
mings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973).
82. Adams, supra note 32, at 854-57.
83. Id. at 854-55.
84. For example, the State of California spent approximately $1 million to redistrict from
1971 to 1973. Id. at 856 n.115.
85. See supra note 56.
86. See TEX. CONsT. art. 111, § 28.
87. See id. (requiring issuance by the Texas Supreme Court of a writ of mandamus or
other writ to compel action by the LRB).





would caucus and select a fifth member as chairperson. 91 The five appointed
commissioners could not hold public offices. 92
Instituting the Common Cause model in Texas runs into several problems.
First, the Texas Legislature is not structured in the fashion envisioned by
Common Cause because Texas Democrats and Republicans do not elect mi-
nority and majority leaders. In addition, Texas has not established a party
structure similar to that in the United States Congress. Second, because leg-
islators with intense party interests select the commission members, a certain
amount of partisanship would still arise during the redistricting negotiations.
Third, no system of redistricting can be totally apolitical. 93
Many states have implemented redistricting commissions similar either to
the type advocated by Common Cause or to the LRB to assist at some point
in the redistricting process. 94 In Colorado, for example, eleven members
constitute the redistricting commission, composed of four legislative mem-
bers, three executive members appointed by the Governor, and four judicial
members appointed by the chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.95
In 1981 this commission unanimously approved redistricting plans.96 The
Colorado Legislature, however, redrew the congressional districts, and the
plan landed in the courts following three gubernatorial vetoes.97
Hawaii's reapportionment commission consists of nine members. 98 The
president of the senate and the speaker of the house each select two mem-
bers.99 Members of the minority party select one representative from their
membership in each house, and these two each designate two persons for the
commission.J°° None of the eight members on the commission may run for
office during either of the two elections following implementation of the re-
districting plan. 101
The Florida Legislature attempted to establish a similar nonpartisan com-
mission in 1978.102 Although the constitutional amendment failed to receive
a sufficient number of votes in the subsequent referendum, the proposal had
some interesting features. Seven nonpartisan and nonelected members
would have comprised the commission. 0 3 The Governor would appoint six
members from a list composed of sixteen nominees submitted in groups of
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Legislative elections through the party system have become critical components of the
American process of political representation. The United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that redistricting plans make a distinct impression on the political composition of the
Legislature. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567
(1964).
94. See supra note 33.
95. See CoLo. CONsT. art. V, § 48.
96. Common Cause, supra note 77, at 26.
97. Id.




102. See Kiser & Robinson, New Constitutional Reapportionment Deserves Support, 52
FLA. B.J. 624, 624-26 (1978).
103. Id. at 624.
1989]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
three by the president of the senate, the speaker of the house, the minority
leader of the house, the minority leader of the senate, and the chairperson of
the party coming in second in the last gubernatorial race.1 0 4 In addition, the
list would include one person of the Governor's choosing.105 These six, by
majority vote, would choose a seventh member who would serve as chairper-
son. 10 6 If the six could not agree upon a chair, the commission would be
automatically discharged and the process begun again. 10 7 The commission
would use specific redistricting criteria in the determinations. 0 8 Within fif-
teen days of a plan's approval, the attorney general would petition the Flor-
ida Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment, and the court would have to
rule on the plan within sixty days. 10 9 If the court invalidated all or part of
the plan, the Governor would reconvene the reapportionment commission,
which would have thirty days to adopt a plan to conform with the court's
judgment. 11 0
D. The Legislature
Although there are some disadvantages to maintaining the legislature as
the initial body in the redistricting process, criticisms directed at alternatives
to the legislature provide good evidence that the legislature should have at
least initial redistricting responsibility. First, redistricting is inherently polit-
ical. The people of Texas elect legislators to make such political deci-
sions."II Furthermore, it is difficult for an appointed commission to
maintain a truly bipartisan approach to an issue so basic to political party
survival. Second, the United States Supreme Court has held that the state
legislature is the appropriate forum for redistricting.' 1 2 Third, legislators
possess the ability to draw more equitable lines when clear criteria, such as
those described later in this Article, are included in the process.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE REDISTRICTING PROCEDURE
The provisions governing the time frames and governmental bodies re-
sponsible for redistricting are contained in article III of the Texas Constitu-
tion. 1 13 In order to make the Texas redistricting process current and
comprehensive, this Article recommends several amendments to article III.
These amendments should include explicit language giving the legislature
the initial opportunity to redistrict the congressional boundaries as well as





108. Id. at 625.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Interview with William Hobby, Lieutenant Governor of Texas, by Arthur J. Ander-
son, Texas Capitol (Feb. 7, 1982) [hereinafter Hobby Interview].
112. See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1977).
113. See TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 25-28.
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all three houses in the redistricting process. Under current law, the LRB
becomes responsible for redistricting only if the house and senate plans are
left undrawn. 114 No provision governs the contingency of the legislature's
failing to reapportion congressional districts within the required time frame.
The first suggested amendment, therefore, tracks similar language found in
the Colorado Constitution.1 15
A. Time Frame
According to section 28 of the Texas Constitution, the Texas Legislature
must apportion the legislative districts after each United States decennial
census. 16 The Supreme Court of Texas has held that section 28 also applies
if publication occurs during the regular session.' 17 The Sixty-seventh Legis-
lature, for example, did not receive final census data until April 1, 1981, and
programing the data into the redistricting computer required additional
time. If the Census Bureau delays provision of the population tabulations,
the legislature would have a very short time in which to devise redistricting
plans before adjourning in late May. 1'8 If the data arrives after the last date
of the regular session, the language of section 28 indicates that the legislature
must wait two more years to redistrict all congressional, house, and senate
seats.1 19 Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby suggests that the redistricting
plans should be formulated within a specified time, triggered by the publica-
tion of the census data. 120
The best approach to the time pressure problem would be a special ses-
sion, called after the regular session, in which the legislature could focus
solely on redistricting.' 2 ' The special session concept allows the legislature
to concentrate on this one important issue without also having to consider
the state's two-year budget and other significant bills that arise in the rela-
tively short regular session. The primary disadvantage of redistricting dur-
ing special sessions is the additional expense for salaries, staff, and general
operations. 122
In order to devise a redistricting plan that can withstand legal challenge
114. See id. §28.
115. The Legislature shall divide the state into as many congressional districts as
there are representatives in Congress apportioned to this state by the Congress
of the United States, as many representative districts as the number of members
of the State House of Representatives as provided by law and as many Senate
districts as the number of members of the State Senate as provided by law.
For the exact language of the source provision, see COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.
116. The Texas Constitution states that "[t]he Legislature shall, at its first regular session
after the publication of each United States decennial census, apportion the State into senatorial
and representative districts .... " TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
117. See Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1971).
118. A Census Bureau delay might result from federal litigation challenging the accuracy
of the census.
119. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
120. Hobby Interview, supra note 111.
121. Id.
122. Common Cause, supra note 77, at 7. For example, in Virginia during 1980 and 1981
the legislature did not produce an acceptable plan until after twelve special sessions at a cost of
more than one million dollars. Id.
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and deal competently with other important issues facing the state during the
short regular session, a constitutional provision should set aside a thirty-day
redistricting session every ten years. The early stages of redistricting
123
could still take place during the regular session, while actual consideration
and drawing of the district maps would be reserved for the special session. If
the legislature receives census data at least two weeks before adjournment of
the regular session, the decennial special session should begin one week fol-
lowing adjournment to allow time to program the population figures into the
computer before the special session begins. This timetable would reduce
start-up costs since experienced employees could continue legislative opera-
tions. In the unlikely event that the legislature does not receive the census
data until a later time, the Governor would call the legislature into a special
session one month after publication. This would allow sufficient time to pro-
gram the redistricting computer, and legislators could hire additional staff.
The second recommended constitutional amendment, therefore, would re-
quire the Governor to call a thirty-day special session within a specified time
following either the end of the regular session or the publication of the cen-
sus data by the United States Census Bureau, whichever occurs later.
B. Apportionment Commission
The LRB currently assumes the task of redistricting if the legislature fails
to implement a plan. 124 A second link in the redistricting chain must take
over the task of redistricting if the first link involving the legislature fails to
pass a redistricting bill. The second link must also take over if the Governor
vetoes one or more of the three bills after the special session of the legislature
has been adjourned. Another contingency to consider is the rejection of a
redistricting plan by the Justice Department because of a violation of the
mandates of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.125
Before a state can implement a redistricting plan, the Justice Department
must review the plan to ensure that it does not have a racially discriminatory
effect or purpose. 126 The time frame set forth in the Voting Rights Act is
very important in terms of its relation to the upcoming elections. Following
receipt of the legislature's proposed plans, the United States Attorney Gen-
eral has sixty days to review and object. 127 If the Attorney General does not
object, the new plan goes into effect. 128 The Attorney General may also ask
the state for further information, and such a request triggers an additional
sixty-day review period. 129  Including mailing delays, a section 5
preclearance submission for the State of Texas can easily take up to five
123. Early stages of redistricting include holding outreach hearings, gathering data, and
programming the computer.
124. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28. According to one of its present members, the LRB
resembles a "Sword of Damocles hanging over the neck of the Legislature." Hobby Interview,
supra note 111.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982).
126. Id.
127. 28 C.F.R. § 51.9 (1988).
128. Id. § 51.10.
129. Id. § 51.37.
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months. Because the primary filing period for legislative seats begins in the
first week of January in primary years,' 30 the apportionment commission
must act quickly in order to satisfy the preclearance requirements. If the
Justice Department denies a preclearance submittal, the Texas attorney gen-
eral has a very limited time to bring a declaratory judgment action in the
Federal District Court for Washington, D.C. and request that the plan be
declared valid in spite of the adverse preclearance decision. 1 3'
History indicates that the preclearance procedure can wreak havoc on the
redistricting process. For example, because the Justice Department rejected
the 1981 Texas remapping plans, the federal court had to redraw both the
congressional and state legislative lines.' 32 Part of the problem involved the
lack of necessary communication between the Justice Department and the
submitting entity, and the Justice Department provided little guidance on
specific proposals. 133
Another timing problem similar to that posed by the preclearance proce-
dure concerns the potential lawsuits that opponents may file against a redis-
tricting plan. Following 1981 challenges to each redistricting plan, the
Texas Supreme Court accelerated its consideration of the house plan passed
by the legislature and declared it unconstitutional. 34 The rationale for the
court's decision was that the plan violated the Texas Constitution because of
"wholesale cutting" of county lines. 135 By quickly handing down its deci-
sion, the court avoided the dilemma of drawing legislative lines itself and left
the task to the LRB. As with the failure to pass a redistricting bill, a guber-
natorial veto, and a Justice Department rejection, nullification by the courts
requires a governmental body of some type to review and revise the maps.
The reasons against giving a bipartisan commission the initial authority to
draw district lines 136 are not as relevant, however, when the commission is a
backup to the legislative effort. The legislature should complete most of the
groundwork regarding the statewide map by the end of the legislative ses-
sion. An apportionment commission can use the basic political structure en-
visioned by the legislature and make the small changes usually needed to
satisfy the Justice Department or the courts. A backup system must be
available, however, in the event of an emergency contingency. It would be
inefficient for the Governor to call the legislature into special session every
time the state has to make a change in the plans. The redistricting procedure
must include a governmental body that the state can quickly organize when
redistricting plan amendments are needed. If an apportionment commission
130. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 172.023 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
131. 28 C.F.R. § 51.10 (1988).
132. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
133. Daily Texan, Feb. 10, 1982, at A-16. The Justice Department's handling of the 1981
Texas plans angered United States District Judge Sam Johnson: "This court was put in the
awkward position of waiting until two days before the deadline for filing for office and then
found out via the news media that the [congressional redistricting] plan had been objected to
by the Department of Justice." Id.
134. See Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. 1981).
135. Id. at 114; see TE-x. CONST. art. III, § 26.
136. See supra notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
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is the type of governmental body that the system should use as the legisla-
ture's backup, two major issues arise concerning the composition of the com-
mission and the time frame for the commission's operation.
Lieutenant Governor William Hobby has indicated that an apportionment
commission similar to the one proposed herein should be composed of
elected officials primarily because of their intimate knowledge of politics, of
the uniqueness of the individual districts, and of the state as a whole.'
37
Although the present members of the LRB may have extensive knowledge
about the political climate of the state, many other individuals are equally
qualified. In addition, although the LRB members may not have the same
conflicts of interest as the legislators themselves, these state officials hold
considerable power over individual legislators immediately preceding an
election year. As an example, four out of the five LRB members ran for re-
election or a higher state office after the 1981 redistricting effort.' 38
In amending the present statute, the state should delete the provisions of
section 28 of article III regarding the composition and operation of the LRB.
Instead, an apportionment commission composed of five members should
take the place of the LRB. The small size of the commission will assure
maximum attendance on short notice, keep costs down, and allow for inter-
action of ideas. The composition of the commission should be as nonparti-
san as possible, even though the legislative and executive leaders will appoint
the members.
After publication of the census and prior to the end of the special redis-
tricting session, four members would be appointed to the apportionment
commission. The speaker of the house and the lieutenant governor would
each appoint a nonpartisan, nonelected member. Those senators who are
not members of the lieutenant governor's party would then caucus and ap-
point a member, and those representatives not members of the speaker's
party would also select a member.
Within ten days after their designation, the four new commissioners
would select a fifth member, who would serve as the chairperson of the com-
mission. If the commissioners do not select a chairperson within the ten-day
period, a majority of the Supreme Court of Texas would make the selection.
The apportionment commission would dissolve once the courts and the Jus-
tice Department approved the redistricting plans. This procedure parallels
the Montana, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania redistricting
schemes. ' 39 More detailed language describing the operations of the com-
mission should be governed by statute. The suggested language for the con-
stitutional amendment is as follows:
Prior to adjournment of the redistricting special session, an appor-
tionment commission shall be established. The commission shall con-
137. Hobby Interview, supra note 111.
138. Lieutenant Governor Hobby ran for re-election; Comptroller Bob Bullock ran for re-
election; Land Commissioner Bob Armstrong ran for Governor; Attorney General Mark
White ran for Governor; and Speaker of the House Billy Clayton retired.
139. See CONN. CONST. art. 3, § 6(b); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 4; MONT. CONST. art. V,
§ 14; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 17(b).
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sist of five members, none of whom may be public officials. The
Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House, the minority members
of the Senate, and the minority members of the House shall each select
one member. Within ten (10) days of their designation, the four mem-
bers so selected shall select, by a vote of at least three members, a fifth
member who shall serve as the chair. If a chair is not selected within
the ten (10) day time period, the chair shall be selected by a majority of
the Supreme Court.
The second major factor concerns the time frame that the apportionment
commission should follow. In order to avoid the timing problems mentioned
in Terrazas v. Clements,' 40 the commission should either commence or re-
sume operations upon the occurrence of one or more of four events: (1) the
legislature fails to pass a congressional, senate, or house redistricting bill by
the end of the mandatory special session; (2) the Governor vetoes one or
more of the three redistricting bills following the special session; (3) the Jus-
tice Department rejects one or more of the plans; or (4) the state or federal
courts declare a plan unconstitutional. The time frames for the commission
should be established by statute. If one of the latter two events occurs, the
apportionment commission would convene in Austin within seven days of
the rejection. The commission would then have fourteen days to approve a
new plan by majority vote and file the plan with the secretary of state. If one
of the first two events occurs, the apportionment commission would convene
within seven days but would have four weeks to devise a new plan. The
difference in time is attributable to changes required by the Justice Depart-
ment or the courts. These changes usually center on specific identified geo-
graphical areas and allow a limited alteration of the lines without a
wholesale change in the plans. If the legislature and the commission must
abide by strict redistricting criteria, the commission should impose few, if
any, changes to the developed plans. The commission should have a month
for plan review either if the legislature fails to pass a redistricting bill or the
bill is subject to a gubernatorial veto. In those instances, the commission
will have to do more extensive revising of the redistricting plans, although
the commission should use the legislature's plan as the basis for its work.
The time periods currently established in section 28 should be reduced for
three reasons. First, in 1981 the LRB effectively used only a fraction of the
150 days the Texas Constitution permits for redistricting. Second, the ap-
portionment commission should use the legislature's maps as the basis for its
modifications. Third, the commission is constrained by the same strict crite-
ria as the legislature. Using the apportionment commission as a backup to
the legislature should prove to be more efficient and equitable than continual
special sessions or waiting two years to allow the legislature to draw new
lines.
C. Declaratory Judgment
The courts can still play an important role in the redistricting process.
140. 537 F. Supp. 514, 534 (W.D. Tex. 1982).
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Prompt review of the redistricting plans is essential because resolution of all
court challenges should take place before the next scheduled primary elec-
tions. Both the state and federal courts have jurisdiction over congressional
and legislative redistricting plans. In Clements v. Valles 141 the plaintiffs filed
suit challenging the constitutionality of the state legislative redistricting
plans in the state court. In Seamon v. Upham 142 the plaintiffs filed suit chal-
lenging the federal constitutionality of the congressional and state redistrict-
ing plans. Several states use the state's supreme court as either a court of
original jurisdiction 143 or as a backup to the legislature. 14 4  A preemptive
declaratory judgment procedure would make prompt judicial review of all
redistricting plans in the state courts possible.
Colorado, Kansas, and Florida require automatic review by the state
supreme court.14 5 Section 28 of article III should likewise reflect an amend-
ment to provide for prompt judicial review of all redistricting plans. The
Texas attorney general would be required to petition the Supreme Court of
Texas for a declaratory judgment of the plan's validity once a redistricting
plan passes the legislature and is signed by the Governor or is approved by
the apportionment commission. Each plan would require submission within
fifteen days after enactment, and the Texas Supreme Court would then have
sixty days to make a ruling. If the court invalidates all or part of the plan,
the apportionment commission would reconvene and have fourteen days to
make revisions in response to the court's comments. The supreme court's
declaratory judgment would preclude the filing of lawsuits in lower state
courts.
The judicial declaration would be the last stage in the redistricting pro-
cess. The remainder of this Article describes in detail the quantitative and
qualitative criteria that the legislature and apportionment commission
should consider during their deliberations. The Supreme Court of Texas
would judge whether the plans satisfy the redistricting criteria in its declara-
tory judgment decision.
IV. THE QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA
Sections 25 through 28 of article III of the Texas Constitution provide
little guidance in terms of the criteria that legislators should use to draw
state legislative districts. 146 Because the Texas Constitution does not men-
tion congressional redistricting, the only guidelines for drawing congres-
sional boundaries are those provided by the courts, Congress, and the Justice
141. 620 S.W.2d 112, 113 (Tex. 1981).
142. 536 F. Supp. 931, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
143. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 16; ILL. CONSTr. art. IV,
§ 3(b); MASS. CONST. arts. of amend. § 247; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; OHIO CONs'r. art. XI,
§ 13; OR. CONsT. art. IV, § 6.
144. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 7;
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 110; PA. CONsr. art. 11, § 17; VT. CONSTr.
ch. II, § 73; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
145. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; FLA. CONsT. art. III, § 16(c); KAN. CONST. art. 10,
§ 1(b).
146. See Ttx. CONST. art. III, §§ 25-28.
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Department. Redistricting may be a political process, but mandatory crite-
ria can also limit legislators' freedom to draw lines with only personal or
party interests in mind. The purpose of redistricting is to attain certain
ends, and requiring legislators to use specific criteria will assist in meeting
those ends.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr 147 marked
the beginning of judicial intervention in redistricting cases. Since the Court's
1973 decision in Mahan v. Howell,148 the focus has shifted from mathemati-
cal equality to questions concerning the quality of representation. Neverthe-
less, the criteria upon which a redistricting plan is based must initially
address equality of representation because population represents the control-
ling element in apportionment cases. 149 Equality of representation raises
several issues: the need for identical requirements between the United States
and state legislative district population, the effect of population deviations,
and the appropriate population base.
A. Measuring Population Equality
In order to understand the degree of population equality among legislative
districts, it is necessary to understand the statistical measures the courts and
drafters of redistricting plans use. The starting point is the "ideal" district
population, which equals the total state population divided by the total
number of districts.150 For example, according to the 1980 census, Texas's
total population was 14,228,338.151 Dividing the number of congressional
seats into the total population figure gives an ideal United States House dis-
trict population of 526,977. Several different measures can be used to com-
pute the extent to which district population varies from the ideal district
population.
Perhaps the most commonly used measure of deviation by the courts is
"range," a statement of population deviation of the most and least populous
districts. 152 The range can be expressed in either absolute or relative terms.
Suppose, for example, that the ideal district population is 100,000, with the
most populous district containing 103,000 and the least populous containing
99,000. The range is + 3,000 to -1,000. In relative terms, the range is
+3% to - 1%, or a total variation of 4%. In the example, the overall abso-
lute range is 4,000, while the overall relative range is 4%.
Another statistical measure represents the "average deviation" or "mean
deviation," which equals the sum of all the individual district deviations di-
147. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
148. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
149. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
150. See Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1981).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 838-39 (1983); Karcher v. Daggett, 462
U.S. 725, 729, 766 (1983); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 23 (1975); White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 764 (1973).
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vided by the total number of districts. 153 Assume, for example, that a state
with twenty congressional seats has fifteen districts with populations of
102,000 and five districts with populations of 94,000. The ideal district popu-
lation is 100,000, and the sum of the deviations is 60,000. The absolute
mean deviation, therefore, is 3,000, and the relative mean deviation is 3%.
Mean deviation is often a more useful measure of variance than the range
since the range may be deceptively large because of the deviation of only one
or two districts.
B. Case Law-Congressional Districts
A review of the Supreme Court's treatment of redistricting population
standards indicates two trends. First, the numerical standards for congres-
sional districts are very strict and will probably remain so. Second, popula-
tion requirements for state legislative districts will remain more flexible than
congressional standards, but will probably become more stringent as com-
puter technology makes smaller population deviations possible.
The standard for congressional plans is based on article I, section 2 of the
United States Constitution. 54 In 1964 the Supreme Court established the
strict equal population standard for congressional districts in Wesberry v.
Sanders.'55 Other cases have adopted this standard. ' 56 The Supreme Court
has yet to adopt a de minimis population difference, but two of the Court's
decisions provide evidence of constitutionally unacceptable population dif-
ferences. 57 In 1969 the Court struck down a Missouri congressional plan
with a 5.97% overall relative range and a 1.6% relative mean deviation be-
cause it failed to satisfy the Wesberry population equality standard. This
standard requires justification for a population variance, or proof that the
variance is unavoidable. ' 58 The Court went on to reject the reasons offered
by the Missouri Legislature to justify the variance. 159
In 1978 the United States Supreme Court rejected a Texas congressional
plan with a total relative range of 4.13% and a relative mean deviation of
.745%.160 The Court specifically rejected the legislature's argument that the
variances were necessary to preserve political subdivision boundaries.' 6' If
the legislature rejected alternative plans with smaller total deviations during
the redistricting process, then the state had the burden of proof when chal-
153. See, e.g., White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 785 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 737 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 764.
154. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. United States Representatives will be "apportioned
among the Several states . . . according to their respective numbers." Id.
155. 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
156. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. at 766; White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 790; Kirkpat-
rick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969).
157. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 790; Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 536.
158. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 536.
159. Id. at 530. The Missouri Legislature's reasons included breakup of political subdivi-
sions, preference for compact districts, and practical consideration. Id.
160. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 785.
161. Id. at 791-93.
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lenged in federal court. 162 In Karcher v. Daggett 163 the Supreme Court reit-
erated its position that no level of population inequality is too small to face
challenge if the inequality could have been avoided by adoption of another
plan. 164 Once the plaintiffs had shown that the population differences could
have been reduced, the state had the burden of proving with specificity that
the variance was necessary to achieve a legitimate goal. 165 Although the
population difference provided for in the plans must be smaller than those in
Weiser, Kirkpatrick, and Karcher, it is difficult to predict with certainty the
outer boundaries of a population variance that would justify rejection of a
congressional redistricting plan.
C. Case Law-State Legislative Districts
Reynolds v. Sims 166 is the leading case concerning population variances
between state legislative districts. Reynolds established three important re-
quirements for state legislative reapportionment efforts. First, some devia-
tion from the strict equality standard for congressional districts is acceptable
in order to accommodate state interests.' 67 Second, the equal protection
clause requires that a state make a legitimate effort to create state legislative
districts as nearly of equal population as practicable.' 68 Third, courts
should decide the degree of population equality that would meet constitu-
tional standards on a case-by-case basis. 169
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the difference be-
tween congressional and state legislative districts in applying the equal popu-
lation standard in Mahan v. Howell.' 70 The Court based its differentiation
on article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which lists popula-
tion as the sole criterion of constitutionality in congressional reapportion-
ment cases, 17 1 and on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, which requires states to fashion districts generally equal in pop-
ulation. Under this differentiation courts may give states broader latitude
for redistricting state legislative districts. 72
In cases in which federal scrutiny of population disparity is concerned, a
three-level analysis of state legislative districts has evolved. First, a state
reapportionment plan containing gross population disparities is unconstitu-
tional per se and cannot be justified.' 73 Second, plans with an overall rela-
162. Id. at 797.
163. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
164. Id. at 734.
165. Id. at 740-41. The Court gave as examples of such goals, compactness, respect for
municipal boundaries, and avoiding contests between incumbents. Id.
166. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
167. Id. at 579.
168. Id. at 577.
169. Id. at 578.
170. 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973).
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
172. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 321.
173. Id. at 329. For example, an overall relative range of 16.5% is clearly unconstitutional.
Id.," see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977).
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tive range between 10.0% and 16.4% are prima facie unconstitutional but
are not unconstitutional per se. 174 The state must justify the deviation by
showing that the plan is free from discrimination and is based on rational
state policy. 175 In the Texas case of White v. Regester 1 76 the United States
Supreme Court held that a 9.9% range was not a prima facie violation of the
Constitution. 17 7 The Court went on to note that large variances between
districts needed justification grounded in legitimate concern for state pol-
icy. 17 8 The Court also pointed out that the average deviation of all state
house districts from the ideal was only 1.82%. 1 79 To date, preservation of
county lines represents the only rational state policy that has justified a plan
within the 10.0% to 16.4% relative overall range. 180 Third, when the over-
all range is de minimis, that is less than 9.9%, the deviation is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of unconstitutionality.' 81 Minor deviations are
insufficient to establish a prima facie case because: (1) census data are often
inaccurate; (2) districts often experience different population growth rates;
(3) "census persons" are not necessarily voters; and (4) attempts at achieving
zero deviation would become an impossible, never-ending process. 182 A
plan with an overall range of less than 10%, however, is not necessarily safe
from attack. The relative mean deviation in Gaffney, for example, was less
than 2%.183 A large relative mean deviation or a clear lack of good faith
effort to minimize population disparity might cause a federal court to reject a
plan with an overall relative range of less than 9.9% The only United States
Supreme Court legislative redistricting case involving population inequality
based on the 1980 census concerned the Wyoming House of Representa-
tives. 184 Wyoming's constitutional policy of using counties as representative
districts and ensuring that each county had at least one representative was
sufficient for the Supreme Court to justify an average deviation of 16% and
an overall range of 89%, an aberration from previous Supreme Court
decisions. 185
D. Population Deviations
The Texas Constitution does not provide guidelines regarding appropriate
population deviations for either congressional or state legislative districts. 18 6
Although redistricting plans must meet the United States constitutional re-
quirements as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, nothing in
174. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 741 (1973).
175. Id. at 743-45.
176. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
177. Id. at 763.
178. Id. at 764.
179. Id.
180. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 328.
181. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745.
182. Id. at 745-51.
183. Id. at 751.
184. See Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
185. Id. at 843-46.
186. See Ti-x. CONST. art. III, §§ 25, 26.
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the United States Constitution or case law prevents imposition of stricter
standards of population equality than the federal courts require. Therefore,
an issue arises concerning the appropriate strictness of the population crite-
ria. If the most important end in the redistricting process is to ensure dis-
tricts of equal population, then perhaps redistricting plans should have a
zero population variance. This approach, however, raises several problems.
First, practical difficulties arise in attempting to achieve zero population
deviation among districts. For example, population shifts will prevent dis-
tricts from having equal populations in the future. Census data are not suffi-
ciently accurate to make perfect district population estimates. In addition,
as stated in Gaffney,' 87 criteria should not force legislatures and courts to
engage in a never-ending search for the perfect redistricting plan. Second,
the democratic principle of equal representation has never been considered
the sole characteristic of the United States governmental system. Federal
and state structures reflect other values. For instance, representation in the
United States Senate is by state, not by population.188 One individual, the
President or the elected Governor, can veto a bill that has been enacted by
two legislative bodies.' 89 Equality of representation, therefore, is not a fac-
tor so important in our governmental scheme as to preclude any population
deviation among districts. Third, very strict population standards prevent
consideration of other interests in state legislative redistricting. Preservation
of the integrity of political subdivisions, for example, might justify slight
population variances among districts. Requiring all state districts to have an
equal population might force the legislature to cut subdivision boundaries
frequently. Therefore, any redistricting plan should allow for some popula-
tion deviations among districts, especially those of the Texas House and
Senate.
Common Cause suggests that state legislative district populations should
have no more than a 5% overall relative range and that the relative range for
congressional districts should be no more than 1%.190 Colorado has
adopted the 5% maximum deviation figure for its legislative districts. 19'
Iowa has adopted Common Cause's 5% and 1% standards. 9 2 Due to the
trends in court interpretation, the Texas Constitution or state statutes should
contain amendments that include the maximum 5% overall relative range
figure for state legislative districts. This percentage, substantiated by prece-
dent, appears reasonable and ensures that the federal courts will not consider
the redistricting plan prima facie unconstitutional.
The overall relative range for congressional districts should be less than
1%. In Seamon v. Upham 193 the 1982 United States district court's plan for
redrawing Texas congressional districts had an overall relative range of
187. 412 U.S. at 751.
188. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
189. Id. art. 11, § 7; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
190. Adams, supra note 32, at 857.
191. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46.
192. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4 (West Supp. 1989).
193. 536 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
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.28% and a relative mean deviation of .05%.194 The court justified these
small deviations on the basis of the state interest in preserving certain tradi-
tional and historical boundaries. 195 Because of the judicial trend in setting
strict population variance standards, the amended constitution or statutory
law should include a maximum overall relative range for Texas congres-
sional districts of .5%. In addition, the Texas Constitution should mention
that both legislative and congressional population deviations must meet the
requirements of the United States Constitution. If the United States
Supreme Court decides eventually to lower the overall relative range for
either legislative or congressional districts, Texas redistricting bodies will
have to follow the Court's mandate.
E. Population Base
The federal census is admittedly not a perfect vehicle for counting popula-
tion. In 1980 and 1981 various states and localities across the country made
more than fifty challenges to the 1980 census. 196 In Cuomo v. Baldridge 197
the District Court for the Southern District of New York acknowledged a
net undercount of the national population and held that blacks and Hispan-
ics were disproportionally undercounted in the 1980 census. 19 8 Although a
reapportionment population base may exclude some "census persons" under
certain circumstances, any plan failing to use census figures only survives
under extraordinary circumstances. In Burns v. Richardson,19 9 for example,
the United States Supreme Court held that the population base could ex-
clude Hawaii's large military population for redistricting purposes. 20° States
attempting to use alternative population bases, however, bear a heavy bur-
den of proving validity if opponents challenge a reapportionment plan on the
basis of specific discrimination. 20 1
Total population represents the traditional base for congressional redis-
tricting. The Texas Constitution requires apportionment of state representa-
tives among the counties according to total population, 20 2 but it also
provides that state division of senatorial districts be according to the number
of qualified electors.20 3 A "qualified elector" is a citizen over age eighteen
who is not a convicted felon, a ward of the state, an "idiot" or a "lunatic. '20 4
Chet Upham, executive director of the Texas Republican Party, and six
Republican senators challenged the LRB's 1981 senate redistricting plan on
194. Id. at 950-51.
195. Id. at 942.
196. See Carey v. Klutznick, 653 F.2d 732, 735 n.10 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
999 (1982).
197. 674 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
198. Id. at 1094-95.
199. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
200. Id. at 94-96.
201. Id. at 92-96.
202. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 26.
203. Id. § 25: "The State shall be divided into Senatorial Districts ... according to the




the ground that the LRB used total population rather than qualified electors
as the base. 20 5 The court upheld the senate plan and rejected the Republican
argument that estimated voting age population should replace official census
figures for total population. 20 6 The court also disregarded population
growth projections provided by the Republicans.20 7 In Travis v. King20 8 the
district court struck down Hawaii's legislative districts. 20 9 The court further
held that congressional plans must use the United States census figures pur-
suant to article I, section 2 of the Constitution. 2 10
Texas should therefore amend the redistricting sections of the state consti-
tution to require specifically that apportionment of congressional, Texas Sen-
ate, and Texas House districts be on the basis of total population as reflected
by the latest census figures. Although the methodology used by the Census
Bureau has faults, it does provide more reliable data than estimates calcu-
lated by mathematicians. Because total population provides the most solid
information for redistricting, the proposed Texas constitutional amendment
should continue to use the census as the population base and to use total
population for all redistricting plans.
F Other Constitutional Revisions
In addition to revising section 25 to require apportionment of senate dis-
tricts on the basis of total population, Texas should delete other sections of
the Texas Constitution to reflect changes in federal law. An amendment, for
example, should omit the clause in section 25 of the constitution prohibiting
a single county from electing more than one senator. 2 11 In Kilgarlin v. Mar-
tin 212 a court invalidated section 26a, which limits the number of state rep-
resentatives to which a county is entitled. 21 3 Because the federal court
declared these provisions unconstitutional as inappropriate redistricting cri-
teria, 214 an amendment should delete them from the Texas Constitution.
V. THE QUALITATIVE CRITERIA
The legislature and the apportionment commission must consider criteria
other than population equality to ensure fair and effective representation.
Redistricting determinations should include two types of qualitative criteria:
(I) a prohibition against dilution of minority voting strength, and (2) a rec-
205. Upham v. White, No. C-1068 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 261st Judicial Dist. of
Texas, Jan. 27, 1982).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 552 F. Supp. 554 (D. Haw. 1982).
209. Id. at 556. Hawaii's districts were based upon the number of "registered voters" and
varied from the civilian population. Id. at 557.
210. Id. at 569-73.
211. A federal court has declared that prohibition of a single county from electing more
than one senator was unconstitutional. Kilgarlin v. Martin, No. 63-H-390 (S.D. Tex., Jan. 11,
1965) (summary judgment).
212. 252 F. Supp. 404, 411 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
213. Id. at 410.
214. Id. at 448.
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ognition of specified state interests in reapportionment. Although the use of
the population criterion limits the flexibility of the redistricting authority to
draw districts of any size and composition, skilled mappers can draw bound-
aries within the prescribed population variances that serve purposes contrary
to fair and effective representation. Indeed, many commentators have noted
that the Supreme Court's preoccupation with the one man, one vote princi-
ple has actually encouraged partisan gerrymandering by state legislatures.2 1 5
While the quantitative criteria affect an individual's voting power, the pri-
mary qualitative criterion centers on the issue of diluting or minimizing the
voting strength of racial or language groups.
The second category of qualitative criteria recognizes state interests in re-
apportionment. These state interests include the integrity of present political
subdivisions, compactness, contiguousness, and nonpartisanship. Redistrict-
ing remains a matter of legislative concern, and constitutional criteria should
therefore include legitimate state interests.
A. Minority Voting Strength
The United States Supreme Court emphasized in Reynolds v. Sims 2 16 that
the one man, one vote doctrine applied without regard to race or place of
residence, and that every person has a right to participate in politics through
the legislature. 2 17 In Fortson v. Dorsey2t 8 the court suggested that oppo-
nents could challenge a reapportionment plan if it operated to minimize the
voting strength of racial groups. 2 19 The constitutional and statutory bases
for racial discrimination claims are the fifteenth amendment, the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and sections 2 and 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
1. The Fifteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.220
Dispute permeates the issue of the amount and type of evidence necessary
to prove that a plan unconstitutionally dilutes minority voting strength. In
City of Mobile v. Bolden 22' a plurality of the United States Supreme Court
215. See generally Alfange, Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the Thorns of the
Thicket at Last, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 175; Anderson, Politics and Purpose: Hide and Seek in the
Gerrymandering Thicket After Davis v. Bandemer, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 183 (1987); Backstrom,
Robins & Eller, Partisan Gerrymandering in the Post-Bandemer Era, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY
285 (1987); Baker, Judicial Determination of Political Gerrymandering: A Totality of Circum-
stances Approach, 3 J. LAW & POL. 1 (1986); Hess, Beyond Justiciability: Political Gerryman-
dering After Davis v. Bandemer, 9 CAMPBELL. L. REV. 207 (1987); Hunter, Racial
Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 255
(1987); Peck, Miller, Packman & Hill, Davis v. Bandemer-Political Gerrymandering Chal-
lenged on Equal Protection Grounds, 17 URB. LAW. 945 (1985); Schuck, The Thickest Thicket:
Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
216. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
217. Id. at 565.
218. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
219. Id. at 439.
220. Because the courts have not analyzed the fifteenth amendment separately in this
context, this Article discusses the fifteenth in conjunction with the fourteenth amendment.
221. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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required a showing of purposeful discrimination to prove a violation of the
fourteenth or fifteenth amendments. 222 Five Justices either dissented or
found it unnecessary to determine the issue of discriminatory intent.2 2 3
Several commentators questioned the appropriateness of the court's hold-
ing in Bolden v. City of Mobile, Alabama.224 Reacting to the Bolden deci-
sion, Congress passed an amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
that required a plaintiff challenging a voting practice to prove only a dis-
criminatory "effect" rather than purpose. 225 Congress rejected proportional
representation as the test for determining discriminatory effect, and estab-
lished a "totality of circumstances" test in evaluating a particular redistrict-
ing plan.22 6
In Thornburg v. Gingles227 the Supreme Court interpreted the revised sec-
tion 2 and held that the North Carolina Legislature had diluted the voting
strength of black voters by the use of multimember districts.228  Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, held that multimember districts cannot sat-
isfy the "totality of circumstances" if an area with a large minority popula-
tion is geographically compact and yet large enough to constitute a single-
member district. 229 In addition, he noted that the white majority votes as a
bloc so that the minority group's preferred candidate usually loses. 230
While interpreting the 1982 congressional amendments, the Court held
that the test of a section 2 violation does not require a specific intent to
discriminate.2 3 I A violation is determined instead by reviewing the electoral
process to determine if the plaintiffs have an equal opportunity to participate
in the process and to elect candidates of their choice.2 32 The Court listed
several objective factors for reviewing the "totality of circumstances" sur-
rounding an alleged section 2 violation, including racial polarization and the
222. Id. at 66-68.
223. Id. at 80-141.
224. 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v.
Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Comandeered the Fifteenth Amend-
ment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982); Packer, Tracking the Court Through a Political Thicket:
At-Large Election Systems and Minority Vote Dilution, 23 URB. L. ANN. 227 (1982); Note, The
City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden: The Requirement of Discriminatory Intent in Vote Dilu-
tion Claims, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 639 (1980).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982).
226. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1986). In Thornburg the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the 1982 North Carolina redistricting plans for certain multimember legislative dis-
tricts. The plaintiffs claimed that the plans impaired the ability of blacks to elect
representatives of their choice in violation of both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The district court order simply substituted provisional
single-member redistricting plans enacted in 1984 by the state legislature in response to the
earlier district court's direction regarding the 1982 multimember districts. Gingles v. Edmis-
ten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Thornburg V. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986).
227. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
228. Id. at 77-79.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 54-61.




electoral success of minority candidates. 233
In addition to a review of "objective" factors, the Thornburg Court devel-
oped a new three-part test that a minority group must meet in order to estab-
lish a vote-dilution claim under section 2.234 The test requires that a
minority group prove that: (1) it is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) it is politi-
cally cohesive; and (3) in the absence of special circumstances, bloc voting by
the white majority usually defeats the minority's preferred candidate. 235
The Thornburg Court held that all but one of the challenged multimember
districts were characterized by racially polarized voting, a history of official
discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and
health services, and campaign appeals to racial prejudice. 236 Those factors,
in concert with the use of multimember districts, impaired the ability of geo-
graphically insular and political groups of black voters to participate equally
in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. 237
With respect to one of the multimember districts, a majority of the
Supreme Court voted to reverse the lower court, holding that as a matter of
law the lower court had ignored the continued success of black voters in the
district. 238 This success resulted in proportional representation that was in-
consistent with the alleged unequal voting power of blacks. 239 Several com-
mentators have focused on the mathematical and statistical issues generated
by the Thornburg ruling. 240 Because particular groups do not have a consti-
tutional right to proportional representation, 24' the controlling numerical
tests of a district's minority composition cannot determine constitutionality.
The constitutionally protected right is one of equal access to the electoral
process. 24 2 A plaintiff challenging a redistricting plan must prove that the
group in question had less opportunity than other residents to participate in
the electoral process and elect legislators of its choice. 24 3 Therefore, the
Texas legislative process should specifically address the various elements
that courts consider as corroborative evidence of invidious discrimination
while encouraging participation of minority groups.
233. Id. at 48-49 n.15.
234. Id. at 50-51.
235. Id
236. Id. at 60-62.
237. Id. at 80.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See generally Eichenthal, Equal Protection III. Voting Rights, Political Gerrymander-
ing, and Proportional Representation, ANN. SURV. AM. L. 93 (1988); Wildgen, Definitions,
Measurements, and Statistics: Weeding Wildgen's Ticket, 20 U RB. LAW. 175 (1988); Wildgen,
Adding Thornburg to the Ticket: The Ecological Fallacy and Parameter Control in Vote Dilu-
tion Cases, 20 URB. LAW. 155 (1988); Note, Fair and Effective Voting Strength Under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.: The Impact ofThornburg v. Gingles oil Minority Vote Dilution Litiga-
tion, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 303 (1987).
241. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1980).




2. Voting Rights Act of 1965
In general, opponents to redistricting plans initially challenge the plans
under the rubric of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.244 States that
fall under section 5245 have an affirmative duty to show that changes in vot-
ing practices are nondiscriminatory.2 46 The first United States Supreme
Court decision focusing on the substantive provisions of the Voting Rights
Act is Beer v. United States.247 Comparing the old and new apportionment
schemes for the New Orleans City Council, the Court ruled that the new
plan in question would enhance, rather than diminish, the effective exercise
of the electoral franchise by New Orleans' blacks. 248 The Court held that
the purpose of section 5 was to ensure that a change in the process would not
make it more difficult for minorities to elect a minority representative, a con-
cept known as "nonretrogression. ' '249 The Supreme Court made the crucial
assumption that racial bloc voting would occur and that the outcome of fu-
ture elections could be predetermined to an extent.2 50 In addition, the
Supreme Court implicitly assumed that only minorities can adequately rep-
resent minorities in politics. 25 1 The nonretrogression standard was affirmed
and expanded by the Supreme Court in City ofLockhardt v. United States.2 5 2
Federal courts enforcing the amended Voting Rights Act have employed
guidelines to adjust federal census figures in light of the unique problems of
racial minorities. A rule of thumb for the courts and the Justice Department
is that a 65% total population majority in a district is necessary in order to
give blacks and Hispanics a reasonable opportunity to control electoral out-
come. 253 The 65% figure represents an enhancement of roughly 15%: 5%
accounts for the relatively smaller proportion of the racial minority that is
eligible to vote, 5% for lower minority registration rate, and 5% for lower
minority turnout expectations. 254
The panel of federal judges in Seamon v. Upham 255 challenged the bloc
voting and "safe" district assumptions. The court recognized the dilemma
of avoiding both "packing" a group of minorities into a single congressional
district, and "fragmenting" a concentrated minority group, thereby diluting
244. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982).
245. 28 C.F.R. § 51.67 app. (1988).
246. Id. § 51.59.
247. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
248. Id. at 141-42.
249. Id. at 141.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
253. This rule has been adopted by federal courts and by the Justice Department when
exercising its § 5 preclearance powers. United States v. Mississippi, 444 U.S. 1050, 1055 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164 (1976); Ketchum v.
Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985); Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 358 n.21 (E.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986); Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd,
444 U.S. 1050 (1980).
254. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1415.
255. 536 F. Supp. 931 (E.D. Tex 1981).
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minority voting strength.2 56 The court dealt with this issue by comparing
the existing redistricting plan and the proposed plan to determine any retro-
gression in voting strength.257 United States District Court Judge Sam
Johnson argued that no plan could guarantee that a "safe" district, one com-
posed of a 65% minority population, would elect a minority candidate.2 58
Both the nonminority incumbents in the challenged districts had won the
black vote by an overwhelming margin in the two previous elections but lost
the vote of conservative whites by a substantial margin.2 59 The two repre-
sentatives, who were greatly interested in the minority vote, apparently
strengthened the minority influence on the electoral process. 260
The most recent decision regarding "safe" districts is the judicial redis-
tricting case of Martin v. Mabus.2 61 Reviewing several Mississippi elections
results, the court found that blacks in Mississippi have enjoyed great election
success in districts with black majorities of less than 65%.262 Because pack-
ing minority interests into judicial subdistricts would leave them without
influence in other subdistricts and would further racially polarize judicial
elections, the court established a 60% threshold figure. 263
3. Justice Department Standards
If the Justice Department had concrete guidelines for evaluating redis-
tricting plans, the legislature and the apportionment commission could use
such guidelines when drawing new district lines. The Justice Department
uses the following factors to determine whether a submitted redistricting
plan has a prohibited purpose or effect: (a) the extent to which malappor-
tioned districts deny or abridge the right to vote of minority citizens; (b) the
extent to which minority voting strength is reduced by the proposed redis-
tricting; (c) the extent to which minority concentrations are fragmented
among different districts; (d) the extent to which minorities are overconcen-
trated in one or more districts; (e) the extent to which available alternative
plans satisfying the jurisdiction's legitimate governmental interests were con-
sidered; (f) the extent to which the plan departs from objective redistricting
criteria set by the submitting jurisdiction, ignores other relevant factors such
as compactness and contiguity, or displays a configuration that inexplicably
disregards available natural or artificial boundaries; and (g) the extent to
which the plan is inconsistent with the jurisdiction's stated redistricting
256. Id. at 949 n.27.
257. Id. at 954-58.
258. Id. at 949.
259. Id. at 953.
260. See id. Judge Johnson seemed to agree with the statement of Texas Senator Craig
Washington: "We are sophisticated enough that we have arrived at the point where black
people can represent white people and white people can represent black people and brown
people can represent either or both. Anything less than that is patronizing." Lenz, The 67th
Stalls Out, GOP Woos Minorities, The Tex. Observer, June 12, 1981, at 7.
261. 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
262. Id. at 333-34.
263. Id.
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standards.2 64
These factors are not fact specific or detailed. Nevertheless, addressing
the Justice Department's elements of a valid plan, plus those in Thornburg,
will significantly assist a state in complying with both section 2 and section 5
requirements. The Justice Department's preclearance procedure does not
provide for extensive communication between the submitting agency and the
Department during preclearance.2 6 5 As a result, it is difficult to draw a le-
gally conforming plan. During the 1980 redistricting effort in Texas, United
States District Court Judge Sam Johnson was greatly disturbed by the Jus-
tice Department's delay in ruling on the congressional redistricting plan. 266
Because the standards used by the Justice Department and the courts when
evaluating redistricting plans are still unclear, redistricting criteria should
not include them. The legislature and apportionment commission, however,
must remain sensitive to the Justice Department's guidelines.
4. Affirmative Representation
Judicial decisions indicate that no racial or partisan group has an absolute
right to representation in proportion to its voting strength.267 The United
States Supreme Court recognizes that a state legislature may draw districts
with proportional representation if it desires.2 68 New York's 1977 redistrict-
ing plan was based on the Justice Department's representations that a 65%
nonwhite assembly district would satisfy Department objections to the previ-
ous plan. 269 New York submitted a plan that split the Hasidic Jewish com-
munity in New York City into two state assembly and senate districts. 270 In
response to a suit brought by Hasidic Jews, the United States Supreme Court
held in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey2 7 I that
the deliberate use of race to reapportion is constitutional, provided no racial
slur or stigma results. 272 The use of racial criteria is not limited to efforts to
overcome past discriminatory districting.2 73
The legislature or apportionment commission should not use a criterion
requiring safe districts. First, this criterion requires a belief in racial bloc
voting. A more logical approach is Judge Johnson's theory that minorities
can have a significant impact on the electoral process even though they do
not constitute 65% of a district or have a minority representative. 27 4 Sec-
ond, the 65% threshold figure does not have a sound scientific or statistical
basis, and it is subject to change. 27  Third, the United States Supreme Court
264. 28 C.F.R. § 51.59 (1988).
265. See id. §§ 51.1-.67 (1988).
266. For Judge Sam Johnson's comment, see supra note 133.
267. City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-76 (1980).
268. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
269. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 152 (1977).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 165.
273. Id. at 161.
274. See supra notes 255-266 and accompanying text.
275. Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
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has already established the requirement prohibiting retrogression of minority
voting strength.2 76 Fourth, the process should limit the number of criteria
to the most important elements and thereby ensure sufficient flexibility and
allow formulation of a final plan without violating civil rights.
5. Proposed Constitutional Revisions
The present Texas constitutional sections concerning redistricting do not
include specific qualitative criteria about minority representation. The
Texas Constitution should therefore specifically state that redistricting is not
to have the purpose or effect of diluting the voting strength of a language or
racial minority group. This provision would satisfy the fourteenth and fif-
teenth amendment prohibitions against minority discrimination. Common
Cause also recommends this provision in its model constitutional amend-
ment. 277 The provisions should not include specific standards set forth by
the Justice Department because the standards are unclear and may change
with shifts in the political climate. Based on the State of Iowa's experi-
ence, 2 7 8 the following constitutional amendment is recommended: "No dis-
trict shall, insofar as is possible, be created for the purpose, or result in the
effect, of diluting the voting strength of a language or racial minority
group."
B. Integrity of Political Subdivisions
In addition to the qualitative criteria prohibiting dilution of minority vot-
ing strength, other criteria, known as state interests in apportionment, are
important. For example, preservation of county lines is a state interest that
is recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a justification for an
overall range of greater than 10%.279 This state interest deters dilution of
minority voting strength in that a plan that adheres to political subdivision
lines presents fewer gerrymandering opportunities. 280 The Texas Constitu-
tion requires that the drafters follow county lines as closely as possible when
they draw Texas House district lines. 28' In White v. Regester 282 the United
States Supreme Court indicated that preservation of county lines in Texas
would have justified the population variances in that case. 283
Two recent federal court opinions reveal the significance of honoring the
integrity of political subdivision boundaries in the redistricting process. Jus-
tice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Davis v. Bandemer,2 84 discussed the
Indiana Legislature's ignoring of traditional political subdivision lines in its
276. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes
249-252.
277. Adams, supra note 32, at 877.
278. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4.5 (West Supp. 1988).
279. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964).
280. Id. at 581.
281. TEX. CONST. art. II1, § 26.
282. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
283. Id. at 764.
284. 478 U.S. 109, 176 (1986).
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1981 redistricting. 28 5 In Davis the legislative members carved up counties
and cities in an effort to achieve the best lines for the majority party.286
According to Justice Powell, the. division of established communities tended
to split those with similar interests and caused nonparticipation by voters. 287
In Martin v. Mabus, 288 the first court-imposed redistricting of judicial dis-
tricts, the court pointed out the importance of protecting communities of
interest and used factors of contiguity, compactness, natural boundaries, and
preservation of existing precinct lines in redistricting. 289 Many courts have
held that the legislature must respect the boundaries of political subdivi-
sions. 290 In addition, several states use the redistricting criterion of protec-
tion of political subdivision boundaries. 291
The preservation of political subdivisions requirement should be included
as a qualitative criterion for at least two reasons. First, use of political
boundaries limits the redistricting authority's discretion to gerrymander.
Second, because much legislation affects local governments, cities and coun-
ties should have their own identifiable representation in the legislature. Un-
necessary fragmentation of political subdivisions undermines the ability of
constituencies to organize and increases voter confusion regarding district
concerns. 292 Protecting the integrity of political subdivisions, on the other
hand, greatly limits the flexibility of the redistricting body. Texas House
districts are much more difficult to draw than the Texas Senate districts be-
cause of the constitutional prohibition against cutting county lines. 293 The
redistricting body has more leeway in forming senate districts because the
senate is not constrained by the restriction of following county boundaries.
The Supreme Court of Texas declared the Texas Legislature's 1981 house
plan invalid for the "wholesale cutting" of county lines in violation of sec-
tion 26.294
The benefits of preserving the integrity of political subdivisions, however,
outweigh the loss of flexibility. Subject to the quantitative criteria and the
nondilution of minority voting strength criterion, the Texas House and Sen-
ate and United States House redistricting plans should retain the current
protections of county lines. In addition, they should to an extent preserve
285. Id.
286. Id. at 176-77.
287. Id. at 176-79.
288. 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
289. Id. at 334-36.
290. E.g. Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 88-90 (D. Colo. 1982); Shayer v. Kirkpat-
rick, 541 F. Supp. 922, 933-34 (W.D. Mo. 1982); LaComb v. Growe, 541 F. Supp. 145, 148-51
(D. Minn. 1982).
291. ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 198; ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1;
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47; MD. CONST. art. II1, §§ 3, 4; MASS. CONST. art. of amend. CI,
§§ 2, 3; MICH. CONsT. art. IV, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. 111, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 6; W.
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4.2 (West
Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-132.2 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 4.001.(3) (West 1986).
292. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575
(1964).
293. See TEX. CONsT. art. III, § 26.
294. Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112, 114-15 (Tex. 1981).
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boundaries of other political subdivisions. The models for the proposed
amendment to the Texas Constitution are found in the Colorado Constitu-
tion and Common Cause's model constitutional amendment:
To the extent consistent with the stated criteria, district lines shall be
drawn so as to coincide with the boundaries of local political subdivi-
sions. Within counties whose territory is contained in more than one
district, the number of cities and towns whose territory is contained in
more than one district shall be as small as possible. When there is a
choice between dividing local political subdivisions, the more populous
subdivisions shall be divided before the less populous.295
C. Geographical Criteria
The Texas Constitution does not include specific geographical criteria for
state or congressional districts. The courts, however, view satisfaction of
geographical criteria as a desirable goal. 296 A district is compact if it is
square or rectangular in shape, to the extent such a shape is permitted by
natural or political boundaries. The requirement of compact districts
reduces the possibility of gerrymandering. Nineteen states require compact
districts.2 97
Contiguousness means that parts of a district may not be geographically
isolated. One federal court has required that districts be contiguous despite
an absence of statutory authority. 298 Twenty-five states require that some or
all of their state or congressional districts be contiguous. 299
The Texas Constitution requires contiguous territory in state senate and
house districts.300 The Texas Constitution, however, does not provide geo-
graphical criteria for congressional districts. Because of the benefits of re-
ducing gerrymandering and grouping constituents, both congressional and
state legislative districts should be contiguous and compact.
The Texas Constitution should include a provision that requires the legis-
295. Adams, supra note 32, at 899-900; see COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(2).
296. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425 (1977); Carsten v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 87-88
(D. Colo. 1982); LaComb v. Growe, 541 F. Supp. 145, 148 (D. Minn. 1982); Shayer v. Kirk-
patrick, 541 F. Supp. 922, 931 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
297. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; COLO. CONST. art V, § 47; ILL. CONST. art.
III, §§ 3, 4; MD. CONST. art. III, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 45;
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 3; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 7; OKIA.
CONST. art. V, § 9A; PA. CONST. art. II, § 16; R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 1, art. VIII, § 1; VT.
CONST. ch. 11, § 13; VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; HAW. REV. STAr.
§ 25-2(b)(3) (1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1571-A (1964); N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 4-100
(McKinney 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 4.001 (West 1986).
298. Kopald v. Carr, 343 F. Supp. 51, 52-54 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
299. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 200; ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; CAL. CONST. art.
XXI, § 1; COLO. CONsT. art. V, § 47; CONN. CONsT. art. III, §§ 3, 4; DEL. CONST. art. II,
§ 2A; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 34; MD. CONST. art. III, § 4; MASS.
CONST. art. of amend. CI, § 247; MIcH. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Mo.
CONST. art. III, § 45; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 3; OHIo CONST.
art. XI, § 7; OKI.A. CONsTr. art. V, § 9A; PA. CONST. art. 1I, § 16; VT. CONST. ch. 11, § 13; VA.
CONST. art. I1, § 6; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; HAW. REV. SWrAT. § 25-2(b)(2) (1985); Mi.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1571-A (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-132.2 (1982); Wis. SrAT.
ANN. § 4.001 (West 1986).
300. TEX. CONSr. art. III, §§ 25, 26.
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lature and apportionment commission to draw districts consisting of "conve-
nient contiguous territory." In addition to the literal requirement of
physical contiguity, this term implies public transportation and communica-
tion in the applicable standard. 30 1 Three state constitutions include the
"convenient contiguous territory" requirement. 30 2 Iowa's compactness cri-
terion consists of detailed statistical formulas.30 3 In order to assist the legis-
lature and the commission, the Texas compactness standard should avoid
unnecessary mathematical complexity. The standard should refer to the
Common Cause definition of compactness as a qualitative criterion in the
Texas redistricting process:
Districts shall be compact in form. The aggregate length of all districts
shall be as short as practicable consistent with the criteria of equal pop-
ulation, nondilution of minority voting strength, integrity of political
subdivisions, and convenient contiguous territory. 30 4
D. Protection of Political Parties
That politics plays a role in redistricting has historically been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court.30 5 As a result, the Court has kept a
"hands off" approach to the partisan gerrymandering issue. The Court,
however, recently found the issue of political gerrymandering to be justicia-
ble in Davis v. Bandemer.30 6 A plurality of the Court agreed with the lower
court that both intentional discrimination and actual discriminatory effect
are necessary to prove an equal protection clause violation. 30 7 To prove a
prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that the plan will have a sufficiently
serious effect to require intervention by the federal courts. 30
8
In Badham v. Eu30 9 a three-judge panel, interpreting the Davis holding,
ruled that California's congressional plan was justiciable, but dismissed the
claim because the plaintiffs could not prove that the Republican Party's in-
terests had been ignored in the process.3 10 On appeal, the Supreme Court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 3 11
Despite the effect of partisan discrimination, the discussion in Davis re-
garding the problems of intentional discrimination against a political party is
logical and valid. As Texas becomes a true two-party state, constitutional
criteria should include a prohibition against intentional partisan discrimina-
tion. The following constitutional amendment language is therefore sug-
gested: "No district shall, insofar as is possible, be created for the purpose of
301. Adams, supra note 32, at 874.
302. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 4.001
(West 1986).
303. IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4 (West Supp. 1981).
304. Adams, supra note 32, at 874-75.
305. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 (1966).
306. 478 U.S. 108, 127 (1986).
307. Id. at 129.
308. Id. at 134.
309. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
310. Id. at 670.
311. 109 S. Ct. 34 (1989).
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diluting the voting strength of a political party. '3 12
E. Preservation of Incumbents
One of the more controversial issues in redistricting involves the preserva-
tion of incumbents. This issue is of foremost concern to the legislators who
draw the district lines. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that
invidious discrimination is not established solely by showing that a redis-
tricting plan is drawn to minimize or avoid contests among incumbents. 31 3
One policy rationale for protecting incumbents is the desire to maintain
"constituency" or "representative" relations. 3 14 In addition, a state may re-
gard preservation of congressional seniority as important. 31 5 The United
State Supreme Court has held that avoiding election contests between in-
cumbents can justify population deviations. 31 6
On the other hand, Delaware and Hawaii have antigerrymandering stat-
utes that forbid legislators to favor any incumbent legislator. 31 7 The use of
political data such as the political affiliations of registered voters and the
addresses of incumbent legislators invites political gerrymandering. The re-
districting process should not necessarily encourage or discourage preserva-
tion of incumbents. The Texas Constitution should, therefore, not include
criteria concerning the preservation of incumbents.
F Preserving Socio-Economic Communities of Interest
Five states have provisions designed to protect socio-economic communi-
ties of interest in redistricting. 31 8 In addition, several courts have suggested
that they regard this criterion as important in establishing the legality of a
redistricting plan. 319 The policy behind this criterion is that one socio-eco-
nomic group should not be disadvantaged by being placed in a district where
it will be dominated by another socio-economic group.
The Texas Constitution should not include the preservation of socio-eco-
nomic communities of interest as a redistricting criterion for three reasons.
First, these interests are difficult to define. Second, the qualitative criteria
provisions already include the specific communities of interest that are most
in need of protection. Third, the idea of "socio-economic communities of
interest" is so broad that it could grant the apportionment commission too
much discretion. 320
312. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4.5 (West Supp. 1988).
313. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 791 (1978); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16
(1966).
314. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 791.
315. Id.
316. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1983).
317. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 806 (1983); HAW. CONsr. art. III, §§ 2, 3.
318. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 9A;
HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-2(b)(3) (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 4.001 (West. 1986).
319. Carstens v. Lamb, 543 F. Supp. 68, 91-93 (D. Colo. 1982); Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541
F. Supp. 922, 934 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Lacomb v. Growe, 541 F. Supp. 145, 148 (D. Minn.
1982).
320. Adams, supra note 32, at 879.
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VI. OTHER REDISTRICTING CONCERNS
The revisions discussed so far concern the redistricting provisions in sec-
tions 25 through 28 of article III of the Texas Constitution. Texas can make
two improvements without affecting those sections. First, the state should
improve the outreach hearing format. Second, the state should increase the
number of state senate seats to equal the number of congressional seats allo-
cated to the state.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Davis v. Bandemer,321 focused
on how a challenged plan was adopted. In Davis the Indiana General As-
sembly Conference Committee drew the redistricting maps with the use of a
computer firm engaged by the Republican State Committee. Members of the
Democratic Party and public were not provided any information about the
computer program. In addition, no public hearings were held at the time of
the map-making. Two days before the end of the regular session the confer-
ence committee released its plan, which both houses of the general assembly
adopted by party line vote.
Although Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion did not discuss this issue in
great detail, the lack of an opportunity for public input seems to have had an
effect on the Court. 322 Because apprising the public of the manner in which
a redistricting plan is put together will not greatly disadvantage the political
actors involved, legislative procedures should encourage public hearings.
The Texas Legislature should establish the procedures by statute and by sen-
ate and house rules.
A. Outreach
A state's submission to the Justice Department must include information
about citizen input. 323 During the 1981 regular session of the Texas Legisla-
ture, the state held public outreach hearings in eight cities across the
state.324 Only after the outreach hearings concluded did those in charge of
redistricting begin drawing district lines. 325 The congressional and senate
redistricting plans initially proposed in the Texas Senate were based primar-
ily on the data gathered from the outreach hearings.32 6
Outreach could be improved in three ways. First, the drafters of the redis-
tricting plan should seek citizen input early in the session, even though the
United States Census Bureau does not usually release the census figures until
April. Second, the outreach hearings should encourage more discussion of
the necessary addition or removal of specific areas from the districts at issue
in the hearings. Population shifts within the state are evident before the
Census Bureau releases the census figures. The public hearings should there-
fore direct attention to specific counties and communities that the redistrict-
321. 478 U.S. 109, 161-84 (1986).
322. See id. at 144-61.
323. 28 C.F.R. § 51.28 (1980).
324. Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514, 531 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
325. Id. at 531.
326. Id. at 531-35.
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ing body will have to add to or remove from the districts at issue. Third,
those organizing the outreach hearings should attempt to obtain a wider va-
riety of input. Most of the individuals testifying at the April 1981 hearings
were party officials, elected officials, and representatives of special interest
groups. 327 Although few people who are not intimately connected with poli-
tics have the knowledge or time to testify, every effort should be made to
encourage input from other members of the public.
B. Increased Number of Senate Seats
Because of the large population growth Texas has experienced in recent
years, an increase in the number of state senators is appropriate. Following
the 1980 census, the average population per Texas Senate district rose from
361,185 to 458,987, the second highest in the nation at that time.328 Texas
also had the sixth highest average population per house district in the nation
in 1980. Following the 1980 census, the average grew from 74,645 to
94,854.329
An increase in the number of senate districts would result in more effec-
tive representation and easier redistricting in the future. A large district
population makes effective communication between the legislator and his or
her constituents difficult. In addition, a large district usually contains di-
verse constituents whose goals may conflict. Texas will continue to experi-
ence population growth in the Dallas-Fort Worth, San Antonio, Houston,
and Rio Grande Valley areas of the state. Those incumbents from districts
with a lower growth rate will continue to protect personal and constituent
interests during any redistricting. Increasing the number of districts will
enlarge the pie that can be shared.
An increase in the number of districts, however, would result in greater
cost and possibly greater disorder in the legislature. In addition to paying
the salaries of additional legislators, the taxpayer must pay for a larger sup-
port staff and higher office expenses. At a time when taxpayers are reluctant
to support existing governmental services, they may not favor a proposition
requiring an additional expenditure of public funds. Also to be considered is
that the fewer the legistators, the more easily a legislative consensus arises.
According to one elected official, "the quality of the work product is in-
versely proportional to the size of the legislative body."' 330
Article III, section 2 of the Texas Constitution establishes a senate mem-
bership of 31 and a current house membership of 150.331 Texas should
amend the section to specify that the number of state senators is to equal the
state's allocation of congressional representatives. Such an amendment
327. Id.
328. Council of State Governments, The Book of the States: 1980-1981, at 86 (1980).
329. Id.
330. Hobby Interview, supra note 111.
331. TEX. CONsT. art. Ill, § 2. The Texas Constitution provides for the house of repre-
sentatives to consist of 93 members until the first apportionment. At any time after the first
apportionment, the legislature may increase the ratio by not more than one representative for
every 15,000 inhabitants with today's upper limit of 150 representatives.
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would give each of the major Texas cities an additional member and would
reflect the probable population growth in the next census. Because each of
the major metropolitan areas would gain additional representation, chances
for approval of a constitutional amendment would be greater. In addition,
an increase in senators will provide an easier means of satisfying the pre-
scribed criteria, especially preservation of political subdivisions, compact-
ness, and contiguousness.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems in Texas's past redistricting sagas illustrate the need for
change. Like any aging machine, Texas's redistricting procedures are in
need of an overhaul. Many changes have taken place since 1869 when the
state instituted its system of redistricting, and the guidelines established at
that time are not appropriate today.
The proposal in this Article attempts to accomplish three things. First, it
takes some of the "politics" out of an inherently political process by replac-
ing the LRB with a more independent commission and requires the use of
criteria for United States congressional, and Texas Senate and House dis-
tricts. Second, it links the various chains in the process-the Texas Legisla-
ture, the apportionment commission, the United States Department of
Justice, and the courts. Third, it anticipates problems (such as rejection by
the Justice Department) and provides for solutions (action by the apportion-
ment commission).
Initial redistricting authority will remain with the Texas Legislature and
will take place in a summer special session following the release of the census
data. Strict criteria will have to be followed: (1) congressional districts must
be within .5% of the "ideal" population, while state legislative districts must
be within 5% of the "ideal"; (2) statistical calculations will be based on total
population for all districts; (3) dilution of minority voting strength and retro-
gression is prohibited; and (4) the redistricting body must consider the state
interests of preserving the integrity of political subdivisions, geographical
criteria, and nonpartisanship.
The backup in the redistricting system is the apportionment commission
composed of five members, none of whom may be an elected or party official.
If the legislature fails to pass a congressional bill, the Governor vetoes the
bill, the Justice Department rejects the plan, or the courts strike down the
plan, the system triggers action by the apportionment commission. Subject
to strict time constraints, the commission is responsible for altering the plan
to satisfy congressional, statutory, or administrative requirements while us-
ing the legislature's plan as a base.
Although apportionment is an inherently political process, one hopes that
the fiasco following the approval of the 1981 redistricting plans will not be
repeated in 1991. If history is repeated, however, the legislature and the
public should carefully consider a wholesale change to the existing Texas
redistricting system as our state enters the twenty-first century.
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